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Abstract. In this paper we propose a symmetric cryptographic approach named
Square Key Matrix Management Scheme (SKMaS) in which a sensor node named
Key Distribution Server (KDS) is responsible for the security of key management.
When the system starts up, the KDS sends its individual key and two sets of keys to
sensor nodes. With the IDs, any two valid sensor nodes, e.g. i and j, can individually
identify the corresponding communication keys (CKs) to derive a dynamic shared
key (DSK) for encrypting/decrypting messages transmitted between them. When
i leaves the underlying network, the CKs and the individually keys currently utilized
by i can be reused by a newly joining sensor, e.g. h. However, when h joins the
network, if no such previously-used IDs are available, h will be given a new ID, CKs
and the individually key by the KDS. The KDS encrypts the CKs, with which an
existing node q can communicate with h, with individual key so that only q rather
than h can correctly decrypt the CKs. The lemmas and security analyses provided
in this paper prove that the proposed system can protect at least three common
attacks.
Keywords: Square-key matrix management scheme, key distribution server, newly
joining node, shared key, wireless sensor network
1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are envisioned to be widely applied to commercial
and military applications [1, 2, 3, 4], such as target tracking [5], health-care [6, 7],
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environment monitoring [8, 9] and homeland security [10]. However, some WSN
applications require certain security mechanisms [11] to verify the source of a mes-
sage and protect the integrity of transmitted data from being maliciously modified.
In order to securely authenticate a network entity and deliver messages, a secure
communication environment is required.
To build a secure WSN, Wuu et al. [12] proposed a Quorum-based Key Man-
agement Scheme. But this scheme has a problem in sensor node addition since the
number of sensor nodes (or simply sensors or nodes in the following) must be odd.
So each time at least two sensor nodes must be added. Furthermore, when two nodes
are newly added to a sensor network, the shared keys (SKs) of some existing sensor
nodes are changed. This may crash the normal operation of the whole system. We
will show this later.
Generally, an asymmetric cryptographic technique [13] generates many large
numbers to encrypt keys and delivered messages. But this is infeasible for WSNs,
since sensor nodes are often powered by a battery and provided with very limited
processing capability [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Therefore, to achieve a high security
level and support sensor node addition functionality, by which extra nodes can
be easily added to a sensor network, in this study, we propose a symmetric cryp-
tographic approach named Square Key Matrix Management Scheme (SKMaS), in
which a sensor node named Key Distribution Server (KDS) with ID = 1 is re-
sponsible for the security of key management. When the system starts up, the
KDS delivers its individual key K1,1, a control key K0,0, and two sets of com-
munication keys (CKs) to sensor node i, 2 ≤ i ≤ n, where n is the number of
nodes currently in the WSN. The first set of CKs is used by i to securely com-
municate with its neighbor sensor j, 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j; the other, also called
i’s individual key, is employed to encrypt messages delivered between i and the
KDS.
When i would like to communicate with node j, the two nodes exchange their IDs
with each other. With the IDs, i and j can individually identify the corresponding
CKs with which to derive a dynamic shared key (DSK) for encrypting/decrypting
messages transmitted between them. When i leaves the underlying network, the
CKs and the individual keys currently used by i can be reused by a newly joining
sensor, e.g. h. However, when h joins the network, if no such previously-used IDs
are available, h will be given a new ID (e.g. n + 1), CKs, the control key K0,0
and the individual key (e.g. Kn+1,n+1) by the KDS. The CKs, by which an existing
node q can communicate with h, are encrypted by using the individual key Kq,q by
the KDS so that only q rather than h can correctly decrypt the CKs, 2 ≤ q ≤ n,
based on the n × n key matrix created by the KDS. Different parts of the matrix
are distributed to different sensors. Furthermore, due to the fast advancement of
hardware technology, memory equipped in sensors is cheaper than before and the
size of a WSN grows rapidly in the recent years. The memory size of a sensor
no longer constitutes a problem. This further makes SKMaS feasible in practical
applications.
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2 RELATED WORKS
Various key pre-distribution schemes used to establish secure channels for wireless
sensors have been proposed in literature [12, 14]. The key pre-distribution scheme




n matrix as a key matrix, in which
different parts of keys are assigned to different sensors where n is the total number of
sensors in the system. The scheme has two phases: the key pre-distribution phase
and pair-wise key setup phase. At first, the KDS randomly selects n keys from
its key pool, in which more than 220 distinct keys have been collected. The KDS
uses these keys to construct an m × m key matrix K, where m =
√
n. The KDS
assigns an element of this matrix, e.g. Ki,j, as a sensor’s ID and the other entries
in the ith row and jth column as the sensor’s keys, to this sensor, implying that
the matrix is indexed by the IDs of the involved sensors. It also means that this
scheme provides the largest maximum supported network size since each element of
the matrix represents one sensor node. When a sensor i would like to communicate
with another sensor, e.g. j, it identifies the common keys indexed by i and j and
uses them to encrypt those messages delivered between them [27].
As stated above, Wuu et al. [12] proposed a Quorum-Based Key Management
Scheme, in which the KDS as shown in Figure 1 a) generates a bn/2c × n key
matrix K and establishes a quorum system based on K. Each sensor, e.g., j, has
the entire column j of matrix K and bn/2c other elements. Each belongs to one
of the bn/2c columns after column j, meaning that each sensor has n− 1 elements,
i.e. Ki,j and Ki,j+imodn, 1 ≤ i ≤ bn/2c, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. As shown in Figure 1 b), after
the deployment of sensors, two arbitrary sensors, e.g. A and B, can individually
identify the common keys assigned to them so that they can mutually authenticate
and securely communicate with each other. In this scheme, node addition is feasible
only when some existing IDs that are not currently in use are available. Also, when
two nodes A and B newly join the WSN, as shown in Figure 2, the common keys
of some nodes will be changed. For example, originally the common key of nodes 1
and 5 was K1,1. After sensors A and B join the network, the common keys of nodes
1 and 5 becomes K4,5. Now, the system cannot work normally.
3 THE PROPSED SCHEME
The SKMaS consists of four working phases: the key pre-distribution, dynamic
shared key establishing, key refreshment, and data transmission phases. In the key
pre-distribution phase, the KDS generates a n× n key matrix K, in which the keys
are pseudo-random numbers. After that, the KDS assigns these keys to sensors
during the deployment of sensor nodes. Before communicating with each other,
each pair of sensors needs to identify the CKs (recall communication keys) shared
with each other, and then generates the DSK (recall Dynamic Shared Key) in the
shared key establishing phase. When the sensor, e.g. m, newly joins the network,
the KDS broadcasts the ID (i.e. m), and the CKs generated for m. Now the system
enters its key refreshment phase, in which the receiving sensor accordingly updates
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a) b)
Figure 1. The KDS generates a key matrix and assigns common keys to a sensor, a) KDS
assigns each sensor node two sets of keys (the shadowed parts), b) Sensors A and B derive
a common key
Figure 2. New sensor nodes A (node 8) and B (node 9) join the network
its key information. In the data transmission phase, sensors transmit data to their
neighbors, and authenticate received messages to see whether they are sent by valid
sensors or not.
3.1 Key Pre-Distribution Phase
As stated above, each sensor i is given two sets of keys. The first set, i.e. CKs,
consisting of all keys collected in row i and column i in the key matrix K (row i
and column i together are called key-cross i), is used to perform one-to-one com-
munication between i and another sensor, e.g. j, by using the computed DSK,
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j. The other one, i.e. individual key Ki,i, is the key employed
by sensor i to communicate with the KDS where Ki,i is the i
th element along the
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diagonal of the key matrix K. The steps of the key pre-distribution phase are as
follows.
Step 1: the KDS generates n2 pseudo-random numbers to establish the n× n key
matrix K.
Step 2: the KDS assigns an ID, e.g. i, which is the index of Ki,i, and the CKs Ki,j
and Kj,i in K to a sensor, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j (including KDS itself since its
ID = 1).
Step 3: the KDS generates a system control key K0,0 and the individual key K1,1,
and then sends these keys to all sensor nodes in the system.
Figure 3. The KDS generates the n × n key matrix K, in which
[K1,i,K2,i, . . . ,Ki,i, . . . ,Kn,i] and [Ki,1,Ki,2, . . . ,Ki,i, . . . ,Ki,n] together called key-
cross i, are assigned to sensor i
3.2 Dynamic Shared Key Establishing Phase
After the deployment of sensors, when sensor i would like to communicate with
sensor j, it sends its own ID, i.e. i, to j. With the two IDs, i(j) can identify the
CK, i.e. Ki,j and Ki,j contained in key-cross i (key-cross j), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j.
Before authenticating node j (receiver), node i (sender) generates an authentication
code (Auth) which contains the result of performing a two dimensional operation ⊕
and +2, where +2 is a binary adder which ignores the carry of the most significant
bit [28, 29], with Ki,j, Kj,i and a pseudo-random number rand as its parameters
where
Auth = (Ki,j ⊕ rand) +2 Kj,i. (1)
After that, i delivers rand and Auth to j and generates the DSK where
DSK = (Ki,j ⊕ Auth) +2 (Kj,i ⊕ rand). (2)
On receiving rand and Auth, node j retrieves Ki,j and Ki,i from its own key-
cross j, invokes Equation (1) to calculate Auth, denoted by Authc, and checks to
see whether the received Auth, denoted by Authr, is equal to Authc or not. If yes,
meaning that i is a valid one, j invokes Equation (2) to generate the DSK.
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3.3 Key Refreshment Phase
When sensor i leaves a WSN, the KDS broadcasts a message (named a leaving-node
message) to the remaining sensors. The format of this message is shown in Figure 4
in which OP code = 0 indicates that this is a leaving-node message.
OP code = 0 | node ID = i | rand | H(K0,0 +2 rand ||K1,1 ⊕ rand , rand |)
Figure 4. The format of a leaving-node message issued by the KDS to announce the
leaving of node i
On receiving the message, sensor j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i, retrieves keys K0,0 and
K1,1 from its internal file, calculates the authentication code H(K0,0 +2 rand | K1,1⊕
rand, rand), and checks to see whether H(K0,0 +2 rand | K1,1 ⊕ rand, rand)c is equal
to H(K0,0 +2 rand | K1,1⊕ rand, rand)r or not, where subscript c denotes calculation
and subscript r denotes received. If not, j discards this message. Otherwise, j no
longer communicates with i. Now i is available and can be reused.
When a sensor, e.g. d, newly joins the network, it may face two situations: with
or without an available previously-used ID in the underlying network.
1. If the situation “with an available previously-used ID” occurs, the KDS assigns
an available ID, e.g. i, to d (i.e. d = i) and retrieves the corresponding CKs, i.e.
key-cross d, from K, 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. If the situation “without an available previously-used ID” occurs, the KDS gen-
erates a new ID d (e.g. d = n + 1) and key-cross d, in which Kd,i and Ki,d are
used by d to securely communicate with sensor i for all i’s, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Before deploying the new sensor, the system manager has to retrieve key-cross d
and node ID d from the KDS and store them into the node. After that, the KDS
broadcasts a message, named the newly-joining message, the format of which is
shown in Figure 5, in which the format of k-msg is illustrated in Figure 6. In Figure 5,
OP code = 1 indicates that this is a newly-joining-node message. Upon receiving
this message, sensor i retrieves keys K0,0 and K1,1 from its internal file, calculates
authentication code H(K0,0 ⊕ rand | K1,1 +2 rand, rand), and checks to see whether
H(K0,0⊕ rand | K1,1 +2 rand, rand)c is equal to H(K0,0⊕ rand | K1,1 +2 rand, rand)r
or not, where script c denotes calculation and script r denotes received. If not,
i discards this message. Otherwise i sequentially searches the ID fields contained
in the k-msg field of this message. In the k-msg, a sensor ID, e.g. i, is followed by
Ki,i ⊕Kd,i and (K0,0 +2 Ki,i)⊕Ki,d, in which Kd,i and Ki,d are the CKs needed to
be updated by sensor i or added to key-cross i. When ID = i as the head field for
sensor i is identified, i decrypts the communication keys conveyed in the two fields
following the head field, and accordingly updates its key-cross i.
For example, in Figure 6, if ID = 2 and d = n + 1, the following two fields are
K2,2⊕Kn+1,2 and (K0,0+2K2,2)⊕K2,n+1. Only the valid KDS has the right individual
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OP code = 1|rand |k-msg|H(K0,0 ⊕ rand ||K1,1 +2 rand , rand)
Figure 5. The format of a newly-joining node message broadcast by the KDS to all sensors.
In this message, the format of k-msg is shown in Figure 6.
ID = 2 K2,2 ⊕Kn+1,2 (K0,0 +2 K2,2)⊕K2,n+2 Kn+1,2 ⊕K2,n+1
ID = 3 K3,3 ⊕Kn+1,3 (K0,0 +2 K3,3)⊕K3,n+2 Kn+1,3 ⊕K3,n+1
...
ID = n Kn,n ⊕Kn+1,n (K0,0 +2 Kn,n)⊕Kn,n+2 Kn+1,n ⊕Kn,n+1
Figure 6. The format of k-msg, included in a newly-joining-node message (see Figure 5),
contains sensor ID, e.g. i, and the communication keys, Kd,i and Ki,d, needed to be added
to the key-cross i by sensor i, 2 ≤ i ≤ n, where d = n + 1
key K2,2 and control key K0,0 to encrypt the two fields, and only the valid sensor, i.e.
sensor 2, which has the two keys, is able to decrypt the two fields. Moreover, after
obtaining Kn+1,2 and K2,n+1, sensor 2 compares the (Kn+1,2⊕K2,n+1) generated by
itself with the fourth field from the head field to see whether they are equal or not.
If yes, the message is authenticated. In our scheme, the addition of d, no matter
whether d = n + 1 or 2 ≤ d ≤ n, does not change those CKs currently used by all
existing sensors.
3.4 Data Transmission Phase
After completing the authentication between two sensors, the two sensors can com-
municate with each other by sending a data message, the format of which is shown
in Figure 7, in which OP code = 2 indicates that this is a data message and d-msg is
the data that the sender, e.g. node i, would like to send to the receiver, i.e. node j.
When receiving this message, sensor j retrieves the source ID, Destination ID and
(d-msg⊕ Auth) +2 DSK fields, computes the hash value HMAC = H ′(i | j | rand |
(d-msg⊕Auth) +2 DSK,DSK) and checks to see whether the value is equal to the
one conveyed in the received message or not to ensure data integrity of the message
where H ′(x, y) is a hash function hashing x with key y. Since only a valid sensor
has the right Auth and DSK to produce the correct hash value, if the two hash
values are equal, the message is authenticated, meaning that the sensor sending this
message is a valid one.




(x−DSK)⊕ Auth, if x ≥ DSK,
(x + DSK + 1)⊕ Auth, if x < DSK. (3)
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OP code = 2 | SourceID = i | DestinationID = j | rand |
(d-msg⊕ Auth) +2 DSK | H ′(i||j||rand ||d-msg⊕ Auth +2 DSK,DSK)
Figure 7. The format of a data message, in which d-msg is the data that sensor i would
like to send to sensor j
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
The SKMaS has four features, including:
1. Verifying whether a transmitted message is a legitimate one or not by checking
a hash authentication code with a dynamic key [20], e.g. rand (see Figures 4, 5
and 7).
2. The OP code as the head of a transmitted message explicitly indicates the func-
tion of this message to improve the efficiency of the following authentication and
message processing.
3. The DSK carried in a data message effectively improves the security level of the
message since for different communication sessions, DSKs varies due to invoking
different rands.
4. A two dimensional operation (i.e. +2 and ⊕) invoked by the SKMaS to en-
crypt/decrypt data messages enhances the security level of the WSN.
In this section, we analyze the security of the transmitted messages and describe
how the SKMaS effectively defends against three common attacks, including eaves-
dropping [21], forgery KDS, and forgery sensor node [22], and show that the SKMaS
can effectively prevent a WSN from being attacked by them.
4.1 Security of a Message
The newly-joining-node and leaving-node messages issued by the KDS possess a high
security mechanism and are discussed as follows.
First, the leaving-node message shown in Figure 4 is secure. Since the hacker
does not have the control key K0,0 and KDS’s individual key K1,1, he/she cannot
generate correct hash authentication code H(K0,0 +2 rand | K1,1 ⊕ rand, rand).
Second, the newly-joining-node message illustrated in Figure 5 is more secure
than the leaving-node message since this message contains the hash authentication
code H (K0,0 ⊕ rand | K1,1 +2 rand, rand) and the self-checking code, Kn+1,j ⊕
Kj,n+1, 2 ≤ j ≤ n.
Basically, only the KDS and the intended receiving sensor node j have the
individual key Kj,j, 2 ≤ j ≤ n, with which the KDS encrypts the newly-joining
node d’s CKs (i.e. Kj,j ⊕ Kn+1,j and (K0,0 +2 Kj,j) ⊕ randj,n+1 fields in Figure 6
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where d = n + 1) and j decrypts the CKs so as to obtain the correct self-checking
code Kn+1,j ⊕Kj,n+1. Even if one of the sensor nodes, e.g. m, was captured by the
hacker, with the parameters that m has, the hacker cannot correctly generate other
nodes’ self-checking codes. We then dare to say that a newly-joining-node message
is well protected.
Lemma 1. Let K0,0, Kj,j, Kj,n+1 and Kn+1,j be all n bits long, 2 ≤ j ≤ n. The
probability p of correctly generating the self-checking code Kn+1,j ⊕ Kj,n+1 shown
in Figure 6 by the hacker is p = 1
2n
.
Proof. To correctly generate the self-checking code Kn+1,j ⊕ Kj,n+1, the hacker
needs to correctly decrypt the keys Kj,j ⊕ Kn+1,j and (K0,0 +2 Kj,j)) ⊕ Kj,n+1 to
obtain the pseudo-random keys Kj,n+1 and Kn+1,j. However, both K0,0 and Kj,j are
unknown to the hacker. The probability of correctly generating Kj,j ⊕Kn+1,j and
(K0,0 +2 Kj,j)⊕Kj,n+1 by the hacker is 12n . In other words, when a sensor j receives
an illegal newly-joining-node message broadcasted by the hacker, the probability p
with which sensor node j correctly decrypt the corresponding portion of the message,
i.e., ID = i | Kj,j ⊕Kn+1,j | (K0,0 +2 Kj,j)⊕Kj,n+1 | Kn+1,j ⊕Kj,n+1, to obtain the















× 2n = 1
2n
, where 2n is the number of the possible value-
combinations of each of Kn+1,j and Kj,n+1. 2
Lemma 2. Let K0,0, Kj,j, Kj,n+1 and Kn+1,j be n bits long, 2 ≤ j ≤ n. The prob-
ability p of recovering the correct value of Kj,j from the corresponding portion
ID= j | Kj,j ⊕ Kn+1,j | (K0,0 +2 Kj,j) ⊕ Kj,n+1 | Kn+1,j ⊕ Kj,n+1 conveyed in the
illegally intercepted newly-joining-node message on one trial is p = 1
2n
.
Proof. On receiving the corresponding portion of the newly-joining-node message,
the hacker may guess a pair of keys (X, Y ) such that X ⊕ Y = (Kn+1,j ⊕Kj,n+1)r
where subscript r denotes that the value of X ⊕ Y is retrieved from the mes-
sage. Continuously, he/she may try to obtain the individual key Kj,j by performing
(Kj,j)c = (Kn+1,j ⊕Kj,n+1)r ⊕ X and (K0,0 +2 K(j, j))c = (Kn+1,j ⊕Kj,n+1)r ⊕ Y ,
where subscript c denotes the value calculated by the hacker. However, without
knowing Kj,j and K0,0, the hacker cannot verify whether the calculated values of
(Kj,j)c and (K0,0+2Kj,j)c are correct or not. That is, even though the hacker receives
the newly-joining-node message and retrieves the portion ID = j | Kj,j ⊕ Kn+1,j |
(K0,0 +2 Kj,j) ⊕ Kj,n+1 | Kn+1,j ⊕ Kj,n+1, there is no way for the hacker to make
sure that the obtained Kj,j is correct or not, except by a blind guess. Hence, the
probability p of recovering the correct value of Kj,j from the portion of an illegally
intercepted newly-joining-node message on one trial is p = 1
2n
.
Furthermore, the data message m delivered between sensor node i and sensor
node j, as shown in Figure 7, is protected by the pseudo-random variables rand,
Auth and DSK, which are themselves different in different times of communication.
Arguments of above two paragraphs contribute two security mechanisms for
a data message. 2
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1. The hash authentication code H ′(i | j | rand | (d-msg⊕ Auth) +2 DSK,DSK)
contained in a data message possesses three security functions, including au-
thentication [23], integrity [24], and non-repudiation [25].
2. d-msg shown in Figure 7 is well protected by Auth, DSK, and two-dimensional
operation ⊕ and +2. Only sensor node i and sensor node j have the commu-
nication keys Ki,j and Kj,i, by which they can correctly encrypt/decrypt the
d-msg.
From the above analyses, we can see that the newly-joining-node message shown
in Figure 5 and the data message illustrated in Figure 7 are well protected by the
SKMaS.
4.2 Eavesdropping Attack
Due to the wireless nature, messages sent by sensor nodes and the KDS can be
accessed by a sensor located within the communication area of the sender. As
described above, illegal users cannot decrypt messages protected by DSK derived
from rand, Ki,j and Kj,i (see Equations (2) and (3)). In this study, different messages
are dynamically encrypted by different pseudo-random keys, i.e. rands, thus having
a higher security level than that protected by static keys [26]. In other words,
messages delivered in the data transmission phase are secure. So the eavesdropping
attack does not work.
4.3 Forgery KDS Attack
A forgery KDS may send faked messages intending to cheat sensors that some sensor
nodes leave or newly join the network. This kind of attack can be prevented by the
unique individual key Ki,i, 2 ≤ i ≤ n, which is only known to sensor i and the
KDS, and is used to encrypt messages and authenticate the integrity of messages
delivered between i and KDS. Therefore, only the valid KDS has the right Ki,i and
only i can correctly use it to decrypt the messages issued by the KDS, meaning that
the SKMaS can effectively defend the forgery KDS attack.
4.4 Forgery Sensor Node Attack
If a hacker, e.g. b′, disguising itself as the valid sensor b, sends a data message to c,
since b′ does not have Kb,c and Kc,b, the data message cannot pass the authentication
performed by c (see Figure 7). Thus b′ is incapable of identifying the right DSK
for further interacting with sensor c. Also, a faked node cannot decrypt messages
issued by a valid one because it does not own the right DSK.
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Dynamic Shared Key Establishing Phase








Auth = (Ki,j ⊕ rand) +2
Kj,i (see Equation (1))
14.931 31.176 53.845 Retreving Ki,j and Kj,i
from key-cross i or K,
generating a rand, and
performing +2 and ⊕
DSK = (Ki,j⊕Auth)+2
(Kj,i⊕ rand) (see Equa-
tion (2))
1.757 3.284 6.953 Reusing Ki,j , Kj,i, Auth
and rand retrieved and
produced in the genera-
tion process of Auth, and
performing +2 and ⊕
Key Refreshment Phase
H(K0,0 +2 rand |
K1,1 ⊕ rand |
K1,1 +2 rand, rand)
(see Figure 4)
15.331 31.712 58.161 Retreving K0,0 and K1,1,
generating a new rand,
and performing +2, ⊕, |
and H(,)
H(K0,0 | K1,1 +2
rand +2 rand, rand) (see
Figure 5)
15.364 29.031 57.228 Retreving K0,0 and K1,1,
generating a new rand,





1.615 2.916 5.833 Reusing Auth, and DSK,
generating d-msg, and
performing +2 and ⊕
H ′(i | j | rand |
(d-msg ⊕ Auth) +2
DSK,DSK) (see
Figure 7)
14.371 28.17 53.632 Reusing (d-msg⊕Auth)+2
DSK, generating a new
rand, and performing +2,
⊕, | and H(,)
Table 1. The expression generation times in the dynamic shared key establishing, key
refreshment and data transmission phases
5 SIMULATION AND PERFORMANCE
Our experimental environment is developed on two identical desktop computers
equipped with an Intel i5-3450 at 3.1 Ghz 16 Gb of memory and running the Win-
dows 7 Operating System with Java JDK 7u21. The wireless environment is
IEEE.802.11g with 54 Mbps as its transmission speed. The expression generation
times of the dynamic shared key establishing, key refreshment and data transmis-
sion phases on different key lengths are shown in Table 1. In this table, the time
consumed to generate the pseudo-random parameter rand is long, making it around
ten times the time required to generate those expressions excluding the rand. The
average generation times of the expressions excluding the generation of the rand on
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256, 512 and 1 024 bits are around 1.5, 3 and 6 ms, respectively. If the generation
of the rand is required, the times on 256, 512, and 1 024 bits are around 15, 30,
and 55 ms, respectively, showing that the proposed scheme has low computation
overhead. Since the experiment was performed on desktop computers with Wi-Fi,
the times required by employing real sensors equipped with Zigbee as their wireless
communication protocol need to be multiplied by 100 when they are tested in real
sensors.
The message transmission times are shown in Table 2, in which the longest time
was performing key refreshment. In this phase, k-msg is a variable, the size of which
varies depending on the number of invoked senors, i.e. n, in the underlying WSN.
For example, if n = 1 000, the time required to send the key refreshment message
(Figures 5 and 6) on key length = 1 024 bits is 0.021 + 0.057 × 1 000 = 57.021 ms.
This is still acceptable.
Key Length 256 bits (ms) 512 bits (ms) 1 024 bits
(ms)
The key refreshment: The leaving-
node message (see Figure 4)
0.007 0.012 0.021
The key refreshment: The newly-








The data message: A data message
(Figure 7)
0.012 0.022 0.041
Table 2. The message transmission times of the key refreshment and data transmission
phases
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES
In this paper, we design and analyze a square key matrix management scheme to se-
curely protect wireless sensor networks. To increase the resiliency of sensor networks,
our scheme supports an efficient sensor-node-addition mechanism to deal with the
dilemma in which since a sensor network does not have available previously-used IDs,
adding extra sensor nodes will change the DSKs used by other nodes and may aggra-
vate or even crash the whole system. We also evaluate and show that the proposed
system can effectively defend from three common attacks. The system enhances
the security and resiliency of the sensor networks without conducting tremendous
amount of computation and complicated cryptographic techniques.
In the future, we would like to improve the reliability and derive working model
for the proposed system. To further enhance performance and reduce the size of
a delivered message, we plan to devise an authentication function to substitute for
the pseudo-random number keys illustrated in Figure 6. In other words, we only
need to invoke a function instead of issuing a big message containing k-msg (see
Square Key Matrix Management Scheme in Wireless Sensor Networks 181
Figure 5) or n authentication messages for message authentication. These constitute
our future studies.
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